We investigate relationships between versions of derivability conditions for provability predicates. We show several implications and nonimplications between the conditions, and we discuss unprovability of consistency statements induced by derivability conditions. Among other things, we improve Buchholz's schematic proof of provable Σ1-completeness. arXiv:1902.00895v1 [math.LO] 3 Feb 2019 Proposition 2.4. 1. D1 ⇒ ∆ 0 C. 2. ∆ 0 C and B m for some m ≥ 1 ⇒ D1.
Introduction
In his famous paper [8] , Gödel proved the second incompleteness theorem with only a sketched proof. Gödel explained that by formalizing his proof of the first incompleteness theorem, the consistency statement ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬Pr T (x)) saying "there exists a T -unprovable formula" cannot be proved in T if T is consistent. To carry out his idea, it is desirable that the formula Pr T (x) enjoys some natural properties as a formalization of the notion of T -provability. He wrote that a detailed proof would be presented in a forthcoming work, but such a paper was not published after all.
The first detailed proof of the second incompleteness theorem was presented in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik [10] by Hilbert and Bernays. Especially they formulated a set of conditions for provability predicates which is sufficient for the second incompleteness theorem. Let Pr T (x) be some Σ 1 provability predicate of T . They proved that if Pr T (x) satisfies the following conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3, then the consistency statement ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)) cannot be proved in T if T is consistent.
HB2 : T Pr T ( ¬ϕ(x) ) → Pr T ( ¬ϕ(ẋ) ).
HB3 : T f (x) = 0 → Pr T ( f (ẋ) = 0 ) for every primitive recursive term f (x).
Here ϕ(ẋ) is a primitive recursive term corresponding to a function calculating the Gödel number of the formula ϕ(n) from n, where n is the numeral for n. These conditions are called the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions.
Löb [17] proved that if Pr T (x) satisfies the following conditions D1, D2 and D3, then Löb's theorem holds, that is, for any formula ϕ, if T Pr T ( ϕ ) → ϕ, then ϕ.
D1 : If T ϕ, then T Pr T ( ϕ ).
D3 : T Pr T ( ϕ ) → Pr T ( Pr T ( ϕ ) ).
Note that every provability predicate automatically satisfies D1. The conditions D1 and D2 were established by Hilbert and Bernays, and the condition D3 was introduced by Löb. The conditions D1, D2 and D3 are nowadays called the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions which are well-known as sufficient conditions for a proof of the second incompleteness theorem. In fact, it is easy to see that Löb's theorem implies that the consistency statement ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) cannot be proved in T if T is consistent. The Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions together with Löb's theorem are basis for modal logical investigations of provability predicates (see [2, 5, 12, 21] ).
Other sufficient conditions for the second incompleteness theorem were formulated by authors such as Jeroslow, Montagna and Buchholz. Jeroslow [13] proved that the following condition which is a variant of D3 implies the unprovability of ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)).
• T Pr T (t) → Pr T ( Pr T (t) ) for every primitive recursive term t.
Notice that D3 and Jeroslow's condition are instances of the following provable Σ 1 -completeness because Pr T (x) is Σ 1 . Σ 1 C : If ϕ is a Σ 1 sentence, then T ϕ → Pr T ( ϕ ).
Montagna [18] proved that the following two conditions are sufficient for Löb's theorem.
• T ∀x("x is a logical axiom" → Pr T (x)).
• T ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) → (Pr T (x→y) → (Pr T (x) → Pr T (y)))). By Montagna's argument, we can conclude that these two conditions imply the unprovability of ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬Pr T (x)).
At last, in Buchholz's lecture note [6] , the following condition was introduced and it was proved that this condition implies D2 and Σ 1 C.
• For all m ≥ 1, if T ∀ x(ϕ 1 ( x) → (ϕ 2 ( x) → (· · · → (ϕ m−1 ( x) → ϕ m ( x)) · · · ))), then T ∀ x(Pr T ( ϕ 1 ( ẋ) ) → (Pr T ( ϕ 2 ( ẋ) ) → (· · · → (Pr T ( ϕ m−1 ( ẋ) ) → Pr T ( ϕ m ( ẋ) )) · · · ))).
Thus Buchholz's condition implies the unprovability of ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ). Roughly speaking, every set of derivability conditions introduced above is sufficient for unprovability of consistency statements, but such a rough understanding does not allow us to grasp the situation of the second incompleteness theorem accurately. Strictly speaking, these sets of sufficient conditions do not induce the same consequence because there are three different consistency statements Con 0 ≡ ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ Pr T (x) → ¬Pr T (¬x)), Con 1 ≡ ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) and Con 2 ≡ ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ ¬Pr T (x)) in our context, and each of these sets of conditions implies the unprovability of one of these consistency statements. It is easy to see that Con 0 implies Con 1 , and Con 1 implies Con 2 . However the converse implications do not hold in general.
In order to clarify the situation of several versions of derivability conditions, in this paper, we investigate relationships between the conditions. In Section 2, we introduce and investigate versions of derivability conditions. Each of these conditions is classified as one of three versions of derivability conditions, namely, local version, uniform version and global version. Among other things, we show that each of two new sets {D1, B 2 , D3} and {D1, PC} of conditions is sufficient for the unprovability of the consistency statement Con 0 (see the next section for precise definitions of these conditions). Then currently we know that four sets Hilbert and Bernays' conditions, Jeroslow's conditions and Montagna's conditions, respectively.
The main theorem of this paper is an improvement of Buchholz's proof of provable Σ 1 -completeness Σ 1 C. We prove that if Pr T (x) satisfies the following condition B U 2 which is precisely the m = 2 case of Buchholz's condition, then the uniform version of Σ 1 C holds.
We prove this theorem in Section 3.
In Section 4, we give some examples of formulas, and from these examples, several non-implications between conditions are obtained. For instance, from our examples, we obtain that {B 2 , CB, ∆ 0 C U }, {D1, B 2 , D3}, {D1, Σ 1 C} and {D1, PC} are pairwise incompatible, and each of them is not sufficient for T Con 1 . Also we obtain that {D1, D2, D3} is not compatible with each of {B 2 , CB, ∆ 0 C U }, {D1, B 2 , D3}, {D1, Σ 1 C} and {D1, PC}, and it is not sufficient for T Con 2 . Moreover, we show that stronger conditions D1 U , D2 G and Σ 1 C G are not sufficient for T Con 2 . From the last observation, we can say that both of the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions and the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions do not accomplish Gödel's original statement of the second incompleteness theorem.
The following figure shows the situation for implications between prominent sets of conditions for Σ 1 formulas satisfying D1.
Derivability conditions
Throughout this paper, S and T denote recursively axiomatized consistent extensions of Peano Arithmetic PA in the language L A of first-order arithmetic. The theory S is intended as a metatheory, and we assume that T is an extension of S. The language L A includes at least {0, S, +, ×}, and we do not restrict our argument to some specific choice of the language L A . Also we freely use terms corresponding to some primitive recursive functions, and we do not fix the situation whether these terms are abbreviations of expressions representing such functions or they are actual L A -terms. The numeral for a natural number n is denoted by n. We fix some natural Gödel numbering, and for each L A -formula ϕ, let ϕ be the numeral for the Gödel number of ϕ. Let x→y and¬x denote primitive recursive terms such that for any formulas ϕ and ψ, PA ϕ → ψ = ϕ → ψ and PA ¬ ϕ = ¬ϕ . Let ∆ 0 = Σ 0 = Π 0 be the set of all formulas whose quantifiers are all bounded. Let Σ n+1 and Π n+1 (n ≥ 0) be the least sets of formulas satisfying the following conditions:
2. Σ n+1 (resp. Π n+1 ) is closed under conjunction, disjunction, bounded quan-tification, and existential (universal) quantification;
Throughout this paper, Γ denotes Σ n or Π n for some n ≥ 0. We say a formula ϕ is Γ if ϕ ∈ Γ. A formula ϕ is said to be ∆ 1 if it is provably equivalent to both some Σ 1 formula and some Π 1 formula in PA. Let Fml(x), Sent(x) and Σ n (x) be ∆ 1 formulas saying that "x is the Gödel number of an L A -formula", "x is the Gödel number of an L A -sentence" and "x is the Gödel number of a Σ n formula", respectively. We assume that PA can derive natural facts about these formulas such as ∀z∃x > zFml(x).
We say a formula Pr(x) is a provability predicate of a theory U (in PA) if it weakly represents the set of all theorems of U in PA, that is, for any natural number n, PA Pr(n) if and only if n is the Gödel number of some theorem of U . Also we say a formula τ (v) is a numeration of U (in PA) if it weakly represents the set of all axioms of U in PA, that is, for any natural number n, PA τ (n) if and only if n is the Gödel number of some axiom of U . For each numeration τ (v) of U , we can naturally construct a formula Prf τ (x, y) saying that "y is the code of a proof of a formula with the Gödel number x from the set of all sentences satisfying τ (v)" (see Feferman [7] ). We may assume PA ∀x∀y(Prf τ (x, y) → x ≤ y). If τ (v) is a Σ n numeration of U , then the formula Pr τ (x) :≡ ∃yPrf τ (x, y) is a Σ n provability predicate of U . If it is not necessary to specify a particular numeration of U , Prf U (x, y) and Pr U (x) denote Prf τ (x, y) and Pr τ (x) for some fixed numeration τ (v) of U , respectively.
For each finitely axiomatized theory T 0 , let [T 0 ](x) be the formula ϕ∈T0 (x = ϕ ). Then [T 0 ](x) is a numeration of T 0 . Let T 0 be the conjunction of all axioms of T 0 , and let Pr ∅ (x) be a natural provability predicate of first-order predicate calculus. Then the following lemma holds (see Feferman [7] ). Lemma 2.1 (Formalized deduction theorem). For any finitely axiomatized theory T 0 , PA ∀x(Pr [T0] (x) ↔ Pr ∅ ( T 0 →x)).
Throughout this paper, the formula Φ(x) is intended to denote some provability predicate of T . However, we deal with more general situations, that is, Φ(x) may not be any provability predicate of T . In this section, we introduce a lot of conditions for Φ(x) which are satisfied by naturally constructed provability predicates Pr T (x). The remainder of this section is separated into three subsections, and in each of these subsections, we introduce local derivability conditions, uniform derivability conditions and global derivability conditions, respectively.
For each formula Φ(x), we define four kinds of consistency statements based on Φ(x). 1. Con 0 Φ :≡ ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ Φ(x) → ¬Φ(¬x)).
Con
). The first consistency statement Con 0 Φ is adopted in Hilbert and Bernays [10] and Feferman [7] . The second sentence Con 1 Φ is the most tractable one, and it is widely used in the context of modal logical investigations of provability predicates. Gödel [8] stated his second incompleteness theorem with the last consistency statement Con 2 Φ . The last consistency statement states that there exists a T -unprovable Σ 1 sentence.
Local derivability conditions
We introduce the weakest version of derivability conditions which are called local derivability conditions.
Definition 2.3 (Local derivability conditions).
D1 : If T ϕ, then S Φ( ϕ ) for any formula ϕ.
The condition D1 is automatically satisfied by all provability predicates of T . The conditions D2, D3 and Σ 1 C were introduced by Hilbert and Bernays [10] , Löb [17] and Feferman [7] , respectively. It is known that provability predicates Pr T (x) satisfy full local derivability conditions. In particular, Feferman proved Σ 1 C for the provability predicate Pr Q (x) of Robinson's arithmetic Q (cf. [22] ). The last conditions B m (m ≥ 1) were introduced by Buchholz [6] . The condition B 1 is precisely D1, and the condition B 2 is precisely the condition HB1 described in the introduction. The condition B 2 was also discussed by Montagna [18] and Visser [23] . The condition PC says that Φ(x) contains predicate calculus.
We prove the basic implications between local derivability conditions.
4. The following are equivalent:
(a) D1 and D2.
(c) D1 and B m for some m ≥ 3.
(d) ∆ 0 C and B m for some m ≥ 3.
6. B 2 and PC ⇐⇒ B 2 and Σ 1 C. 
7. This follows from clauses 2 and 6. 8. This equivalence follows from clauses 4 and 6.
Before describing several versions of the second incompleteness theorem, we prepare two propositions.
The following proposition is a part of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
¬ϕ. This contradicts the consistency of T because T is an extension of S. Therefore T ϕ.
It is well-known that for proofs of the second incompleteness theorem, the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions D1, D2 and D3 are sufficient. This is essentially due to Löb (see [5, 16] ).
Theorem 2.7 (Löb [17] ). If Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, then T Con 1 Φ .
Notice that {D1, B 2 , D3} is weaker than {D1, D2, D3} by Proposition 2.4.4. For the former conditions, we obtain another version of the second incompleteness theorem.
The existence of such a sentence ϕ follows from the Fixed Point Lemma (see [16] )
). It follows S Con 0 Φ → ϕ. By Proposition 2.6, T ϕ, and thus T Con 0 Φ .
Jeroslow [13] proved that if L A contains sufficiently many primitive recursive terms and if Φ(x) satisfies D1 and S Φ(t) → Φ( Φ(t) ) for any primitive recursive term t, then T Con 0 Φ . That is to say, in Theorem 2.8, if we strengthen the condition D3 in this way, then the condition B 2 can be omitted. As a consequence, if Φ(x) is a Γ formula, then the conditions D1 and ΓC are sufficient for the unprovability of Con 0 Φ in Jersolow's setting of language. We show that this is also the case without using such sufficiently many primitive recursive terms. 
, and hence S ϕ. This is a contradiction. Therefore T Con 0 Φ .
Remark 2.11. The following makeshift condition
Our proof of Proposition 2.4.6 (⇒) actually shows two implications "PC ⇒ Σ 1 C − " and "{B 2 , Σ 1 C − } ⇒ Σ 1 C". Also our proof of Theorem 2.10 essentially shows that if Φ(x) is a Σ 1 formula satisfying D1 and Σ 1 C − , then T Con 0 Φ . Then Theorems 2.9 and 2.10 directly follow from these observations.
In this section, we have seen that {D1, D2, D3} is sufficient for T Con 1 Φ (Theorem 2.7), and {D1, B 2 , D3} is sufficient for T Con 0 Φ (Theorem 2.8). Also for Σ 1 formulas, each of {D1, Σ 1 C} and {D1, PC} is sufficient for T Con 0 Φ (Theorems 2.9 and 2.10). From examples of formulas given in Section 4, the following non-implications are obtained. These non-implications show that these unprovability results are optimal.
• {D1, D2, Σ 1 C} ⇒ T Con 0 Φ (Fact 4.3).
• {Φ ∈ Σ 1 , D2, D3, Σ 1 C, PC} ⇒ T Con 0 Φ (Proposition 4.1).
• {Φ ∈ Σ 1 , D1, D2} ⇒ T Con 0 Φ (Fact 4.5.1).
Moreover we obtain the following non-implications.
Uniform derivability conditions
In this subsection, we introduce and investigate uniform derivability conditions. Let ϕ( x) be an abbreviation for ϕ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) for some k.
Definition 2.12 (Uniform derivability conditions).
)) for any formulas ϕ( x) and ψ( x). ( ẋ) ) )) for any formula ϕ( x).
for any formulas ϕ 1 ( x), . . . , ϕ m ( x).
PC U : S ∀ x(Pr ∅ ( ϕ( ẋ) ) → Φ( ϕ( ẋ) )) for any formula ϕ( x).
Usual proofs of the Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions D1, D2 and D3 (in books such as [5] ) are demonstrated by showing stronger uniform derivability conditions D1 U , D2 U and Σ 1 C U . Notice that the natural provability predicates Pr T (x) satisfy full uniform derivability conditions.
As in the local version, the conditions B U m (m ≥ 1) were introduced by Buchholz [6] , and B U 1 is precisely D1 U . The condition CB claims that sentences corresponding to the Converse Barcan Formula investigated in predicate modal logic (see [11] ) are provable. Notice that the condition HB2 described in the introduction seems to be a variant of the condition CB. It is easy to see that each of uniform derivability conditions is stronger than the corresponding local version. Moreover, uniform derivability conditions are strictly stronger than local derivability conditions (see Proposition 4.9 in Section 4).
As in the local version, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.13.
3. The following are equivalent:
(a) D1 U and D2 U .
The condition CB is related to other conditions. Proposition 2.14.
1. D1 and CB ⇒ D1 U .
3. D2 U and PC U ⇒ CB.
The following are equivalent:
(a) D1 U and D2 U . Hilbert and Bernays [10] proved that if a Σ 1 formula Φ(x) satisfies the conditions HB1, HB2 and HB3 described in the introduction, then T Con 0 Φ . In our framework, the Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions can be replaced by the conditions B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U without any substantial change. Then we obtain the following version of the second incompleteness theorem. Theorem 2.16 (Hilbert and Bernays [10] ). If Φ(x) is a Σ 1 formula satisfying B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U , then T Con 0 Φ .
Proof. Suppose that Φ(x) is Σ 1 and satisfies B 2 , CB and ∆ 0 C U . Let ϕ be a Π 1 sentence satisfying PA ϕ ↔ ¬Φ( ϕ ). Let δ(x, y) be a ∆ 0 formula with PA ∀x(Φ(x) ↔ ∃yδ(x, y)). Then PA ϕ → ∀y¬δ( ϕ , y). By B 2 , S Φ( ϕ ) → Φ( ∀y¬δ( ϕ , y) ). By CB, we obtain S Φ( ϕ ) → ∀yΦ( ¬δ( ϕ ,ẏ) ).
(
On the other hand, S δ( ϕ , y) → Φ( δ( ϕ ,ẏ) ) by ∆ 0 C U . Hence S Φ( ϕ ) → ∃yΦ( δ( ϕ ,ẏ) ). By combining this with (1), we obtain
It follows S ¬ϕ → ∃x(Fml(x) ∧ Φ(x) ∧ Φ(¬x)), and hence S Con 0 Φ → ϕ. By Proposition 2.4.2, Φ(x) satisfies D1. Then by Proposition 2.6, T ϕ. Therefore we conclude T Con 0 Φ . Theorem 2.16 is optimal in the following sense.
For the latter condition, we do not know if {Φ ∈ Σ 1 , D1, B 2 , CB, ∆ 0 C U } is optimal to conclude T Con 0 Φ or not. Problem 2.17.
1. Is there a Σ 1 provability predicate satisfying D1, CB and ∆ 0 C U such that T Con 0 Φ ? 2. Is there a Σ 1 provability predicate satisfying D1, B 2 and CB such that T Con 0 Φ ? The following two non-implications from Section 4 indicate that
Usual proof of Σ 1 C U (in books such as [5] ) proceeds by induction on the construction of Σ 1 formulas, and it requires much effort. In the lecture note [6] by Buchholz, an elegant schematic proof of Σ 1 C U is presented. More precisely, it is proved that for a proof of Σ 1 C U , the assumption "B U m for all m ≥ 1" is sufficient. By Proposition 2.13.3, this assumption is equivalent to {D1 U , D2 U }. Hence Buchholz's work is stated as follows.
Theorem 2.18 (Buchholz [6] ). D1 U and D2 U ⇒ Σ 1 C U .
In Rautenberg's book [20] , a schematic proof of Σ 1 C U based on Buchholz's argument is presented. As a corollary to Theorem 2.18, we obtain the following version of the second incompleteness theorem. In contrast to the consistency statements Con 0 Φ and Con 1 Φ , Proposition 4.10 in Section 4 shows that the full uniform derivability conditions are not sufficient for the unprovability of Con Σ1 Φ and Con 2 Φ . From Theorem 2.20 and Proposition 2.13.5, we obtain the following corollary. Moreover, we show that D1 and B U 2 imply a stronger version of PC U . For n ≥ 0, let True Σn (x) is a natural formula saying that "x is a truth Σ n sentence" (cf. Hájek and Pudlák [9] ).
Proof. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies D1 and B U 2 , and let n ≥ 0. By Theorem 2.20,
Global derivability conditions
At last, we introduce the strongest version of derivability conditions. They are called global derivability conditions.
Definition 2.25 (Global derivability conditions).
D2 G : PA ∀x∀y(Fml(x) ∧ Fml(y) → (Φ(x→y) → (Φ(x) → Φ(y)))).
The condition D2 G for provability predicates Pr T (x) was proved in Feferman [7] . Montagna [18] investigated the condition D2 G . The condition Σ 1 C G for Pr Q (x) is explicitly stated in the book [9] . Global derivability conditions are strictly stronger than uniform derivability conditions (see Proposition 4.10).
We can prove the following proposition as in the uniform version.
Proposition 2.26.
Proposition 2.26.2 was stated in von Bülow [25] and Visser [24] . Consistency statements are enhanced by global derivability conditions. Proposition 2.27.
1. If Φ(x) satisfies D2 G and PC G , then S Con 2 Φ → Con 0 Φ . 2. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2 G and PC G , then Con 0 Φ , Con 1 Φ and Con 2 Φ are mutually equivalent in S.
3. If Φ(x) satisfies D2 G and Σ 1 C G , then Con 1 Φ and Con Σ1 Φ are equivalent in S.
This follows from Proposition 2.5 and clause 1.
From Theorems 2.7 and 2.10, and Proposition 2.27, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.28.
1. If Φ(x) is a Σ 1 formula satisfying D1, D2 G and PC G , then T Con 2 Φ . 2. If Φ(x) is a Σ 1 formula satisfying D1, D2 G and Σ 1 C G , then T Con Σ1 Φ . Corollary 2.28.2 and Proposition 2.13.7 show that {D1 U , D2 G , Σ 1 C G } is weaker than {D1, D2 G , PC G }. Moreover, Proposition 4.11 in Section 4 shows the following interesting non-implication:
Hence in contrast to local and uniform versions, {D1 U , D2 G , Σ 1 C G } is strictly weaker than {D1, D2 G , PC G }. Also this non-implication indicates that global derivability conditions except for PC G are not sufficient for the unprovability of Gödel's consistency statement Con 2 Φ even if Φ is Σ 1 . Let LogAx(x) be a suitable ∆ 1 formula representing the set of all logical axioms of predicate calculus formulated in Feferman's paper [7] . In Feferman's formulation, the sole inference rule is modus ponens, and the generalization rule is admissible (see Result 2.1 in [7] ). The following condition was introduced by Montagna [18] . 3. If Φ(x) satisfies D1, then for any sentence ϕ, S LogAx( ϕ ) → Φ( ϕ ).
Proof. 1. This is because PA ∀x(LogAx(x) → Pr ∅ (x)).
2. Let Pr ∅ (x) be a natural provability logic of predicate calculus formulated in Feferman's framework. Then PA ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr ∅ (x) → Pr ∅ (x))) holds by induction inside PA. Since S proves that Φ(x) contains axioms of Pr ∅ (x) by Ax and that Φ(x) is closed under the inference rule of Pr ∅ (x) by D2 G , S proves ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr ∅ (x) → Φ(x))) by induction inside S. Hence S ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr ∅ (x) → Φ(x))) holds.
3. Let ϕ be any sentence. If ϕ is a logical axiom, then T ϕ. By D1, S Φ( ϕ ). If ϕ is not a logical axiom, then S ¬LogAx( ϕ ). In either case, we obtain S LogAx( ϕ ) → Φ( ϕ ).
Montagna [18] proved that if Φ(x) satisfies D1, D2 G and Ax, then D3 is redundant for a proof of Löb's theorem. From Propositions 2.26 and 2.30, and Corollary 2.28, we obtain the following improvement of Montagna's result. 2. If Φ(x) is a Σ 1 formula satisfying D1 U , D2 G and Ax, then T Con 2 Φ .
Proof of Theorem 2.20
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.20, that is, we prove that if Φ(x) satisfies D1 and B 2 , then Φ(x) satisfies Σ 1 C U . For any formula ϕ(v), term t( x), numbers n and variable v, the result of substituting t( n) for v in ϕ(v) is equal to the result of substituting n for x in ϕ(t(x)). This observation can be formalized in PA, and hence the result of substituting t( x) for v in Φ( ϕ(v) ) is provably equivalent to Φ( ϕ(t( ẋ)) ).
Notice that each atomic formula t 0 = t 1 is equivalent to ∃z(z = t 0 ∧ z = t 1 ), and each negated atomic formula t 0 = t 1 is PA-equivalent to ∃z 0 ∃z 1 (t 0 +S(z 0 ) = t 1 ∨ t 1 + S(z 1 ) = t 0 ). Then we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 3.1. For any quantifier-free formula ξ( x), there exists a quantifier-free formula δ( x, y) satisfying the following conditions:
1. PA ∀ x(ξ( x) ↔ ∃ yδ( x, y)).
δ( x, y)
is of the form δ 0 ( x, y) ∨ · · · ∨ δ k−1 ( x, y) and each disjunct δ i ( x, y)
is of the form
for some terms t i,0 ( x, y), . . . , t i,li−1 ( x, y) and variables z i,0 , . . . , z i,li−1 ∈ x, y.
Also in our proof of Theorem 2.20, we use the following PA-provable form of the MRDP theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (The MRDP theorem (see [14] )). For any Σ 1 formula ϕ( x), there exists a quantifier-free formula δ( x, y) such that PA ∀ x(ϕ( x) ↔ ∃ yδ( x, y)).
Proof of Theorem 2.20. Suppose that Φ(x) satisfies D1 and B U 2 . Then Φ(x) also satisfies D1 U by Propositions 2.4.1 and 2.13.1.
Let σ( x) be any Σ 1 formula. We would like to prove S ∀ x(σ( x) → Φ( σ( ẋ) )). By the MRDP theorem (Theorem 3.2), there exists a quantifierfree formula δ( x, y) such that PA ∀ x(σ( x) ↔ ∃ yδ( x, y)). By Lemma 3.1, we may assume that δ( x, y) is of the form indicated in the statement of Lemma 3.1.
Since
by D1 U . Let u 0 , . . . , u li−1 , v 0 , . . . , v li−1 be fresh variables. By equality axioms of predicate calculus, we have
By substituting z i,j for v j , we obtain
By combining this with (2), we now obtain
By substituting t i,j ( x, y) for u j , we obtain
This means
Hence by (4), S δ( x, y) → Φ( σ( ẋ) ). Then S ∃ yδ( x, y) → Φ( σ( ẋ) ). We conclude S σ( x) → Φ( σ( ẋ) ).
Witnesses for non-implications
In this section, we exhibit examples of formulas Φ(x). From these examples, several non-implications between conditions are concluded.
Our first two propositions give examples of formulas which do not satisfy D1. Proofs are easy and we omit them. 1. Ψ(x) satisfies D2 G , D3 G , B U 2 and CB.
2. Ψ(x) does not satisfy D1, ∆ 0 C and PC.
3. PA Con 0 Ψ .
Feferman [7] proved there exists a Π 1 numeration π(v) of T such that Con 0 Prπ is provable in PA. The existence of Rosser provability predicates satisfying some derivability conditions were discussed by Bernardi and Montagna [4] and Arai [1] . They proved that there exists a Rosser provability predicate satisfying D2 G . Also Arai proved the existence of a Rosser provability predicate satisfying D3 G . Strictly speaking, in Arai's arguments, formulas are assumed to be in negation normal form (see [1] ). We fix a natural algorithm calculating a negation normal form nnf(ϕ) of each formula ϕ. Then we can understand that Arai's Rosser provability predicates Pr A (x) are of the form ∃y(Prf(nnf(x), y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬Prf(nnf(¬x), z)) for some suitable proof predicate Prf(x, y). Then PA Con 0 Pr A always holds. Summarizing the above, Arai's results are stated as follows. In [15] , the author proved the existence of usual Rosser provability predicates satisfying additional derivability conditions. That is to say, Let Even(x) be a natural ∆ 1 formula saying that "x is the Gödel number of a formula containing an even number of logical symbols". Proposition 4.9 shows that full local derivability conditions do not imply uniform derivability conditions.
• Let ϕ(x) be a formula with PA ∀xEven( ϕ(ẋ) ). Then PA Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) → Pr I T ( ϕ(ẋ) ) as described above. If D3 U holds for Pr I T (x), then S Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) → Pr I T ( Pr I T ( ϕ(ẋ) ) ). By (6), we have S Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) → ∃xEven( Pr I T ( ϕ(ẋ) ) ). Since Pr I T (x) contains an odd number of logical symbols, ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) is proved in S, and this is a contradiction. Hence D3 U does not hold for Pr I T (x).
• As described above, PA Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) → ∃x¬Pr I T ( 0 = 0 ∧ẋ =ẋ ). If S ∀x(0 = 0 ∧ x = x → Pr I T ( 0 = 0 ∧ẋ =ẋ )) holds, then S Pr T ( 0 = 0 ) → ∃x¬(0 = 0 ∧ x = x). This implies S ¬Pr T ( 0 = 0 ), a contradiction. Therefore S ∀x(0 = 0 ∧ x = x → Pr I T ( 0 = 0 ∧ẋ =ẋ )). This shows that ∆ 0 C U does not hold for Pr I T (x).
• PC U fails to hold because PA ∀xPr ∅ ( 0 = 0 ∧ẋ =ẋ ). Proof. For each formula ϕ, let n(ϕ) be the number of occurrences of the symbol ¬ in ϕ. We may use a function symbol n(x) corresponding to this function such that PA ∀x(Fml(x) → n(x) ≤ x). Let Pr II T (x) be the Σ 1 formula Pr T [n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x)](x). Then Pr II T (x) is a Σ 1 provability predicate of T by Lemma 4.8.1. Let ϕ( x) be any formula. Then PA ∀ x(n( ϕ( ẋ) ) = k) for some natural number k. Since PA ∀z(Prf T ( 0 = 0 , z) → n( ϕ( ẋ) ) ≤ z ∨ Even( ϕ( ẋ) )), we obtain PA ∀ x(Pr T ( ϕ( ẋ) ) ↔ Pr II T ( ϕ( ẋ) )) by Lemma 4.8.2. Therefore Pr II T (x) satisfies D1 U , D2 U and Σ 1 C U .
By Lemma 4.8.3, we have PA ∀x∀z(Prf T ( 0 = 0 , z) ∧ Fml(x) ∧ Pr II T (x) → (n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x))) (7) because PA ∀x(Fml(x) ∧ x ≤ z → n(x) ≤ z ∨ Even(x)).
As in Proposition 4.9, failure of D2 G , ∆ 0 C G and PC G for Pr II T (x) follow from (7) and the facts PA ∀z∃y(Fml(y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧ ¬Even(y)), PA ∀z∃y(True ∆0 (y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧ ¬Even(y)) and PA ∀z∃y(Pr ∅ (y) ∧ n(y) > z ∧ ¬Even(y)), respectively.
Since ¬ξ is not provable in T , Pr VI T (x) is a Σ 1 provability predicate of T , and also D1 U holds for Pr VI T (x). The conditions D3 G and ∆ 0 C G follow from PA ∀x( Pr VI T (ẋ) = ¬ξ ) and PA ∀x(True ∆0 (x) → x = ¬ξ ), respectively.
We prove PC G . Let M be an L A -structure whose domain is a singleton {e}. Then for every closed L A -term t, t M = e. Thus M |= ξ ∨ 0 = S(0). Therefore ¬ξ is not provable in predicate calculus. The above argument can be formalized in PA, and so PA ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr ∅ (x) → x = ¬ξ )). Then by PC G for Pr T (x), we conclude PA ∀x(Fml(x) → (Pr ∅ (x) → Pr VI T (x))). Since PA ¬Pr VI T ( ¬ξ ) and T ξ , we can prove S Pr VI T ( ∀x¬(ξ ∨ x = S(0)) ) → ∀xPr VI T ( ¬(ξ ∨ẋ = S(0)) ) by (11) . The conditions Σ 1 C and CB fail to hold because of them.
By Proposition 2.4, Pr VI
T (x) does not satisfy D2 and B 2 . At last, we prove that our Theorem 2.20 is actually an improvement of Buchholz's theorem (Theorem 2.18).
Theorem 4.15. There exists a Σ 1 provability predicate Pr * (x) of PA which satisfies D1 U , B U 2 , Σ 1 C G and PC G but does not satisfy D2. This theorem is proved by using Beklemishev's arithmetical completeness theorem of the bimodal logic CS 2 with respect to independent Σ 1 numerations (see Beklemishev [3] ). For this, we need some preparations. The language of CS 2 is that of propositional logic equipped with two unary modal operators [0] and [1] . Formulas in this language are called CS 2 We say a structure M = (W, K 0 , K 1 , ≺, , b) is a CS 2 -model if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. W is a nonempty finite set.
2. K 0 and K 1 are subsets of W with W = K 0 ∪ K 1 .
3. ≺ is a strict partial ordering over W . [21] ). For any CS 2 -formula A, the following are equivalent:
